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Abstract 
 
This paper questions the Lewis Path perspective of a “world without agriculture” which underpins the 
“structural transformation” paradigm of “modern growth.” It shows that the Lewis Path is only one of 
four potential structural paths, and that half of the world’s population is spiralling into a “Lewis Trap” 
with more farmers and an increasing income gap between them and other workers. After showing how 
land constraints and the productivity dynamics outside agriculture might prevent this population from 
switching to a Lewis Path, it delineates the condition of an alternative path that would not transfer the 
disparity problem to cities. 
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Un monde sans paysans ? 
Le chemin de Lewis revisité 
 
Résumé 
 
Cet article interroge le paradigme de « transformation structurelle » et de « croissance moderne » qui 
conduit in fine à un « monde sans agriculture ». Il montre d’abord que ce « chemin de Lewis » (Lewis 
Path) n’est qu’une voie parmi quatre possibles, et que seuls les pays industrialisés ou en transition 
l’ont suivi durant les dernières décennies. La moitié de la population mondiale est plutôt embarquée 
dans une direction diamétralement opposée (Lewis Trap) où la population active agricole croît ainsi 
que son écart de revenu avec les autres travailleurs. En recomposant les productivités partielles de la 
terre et du travail en calories de 1961 à 2007, l’article montre ensuite comment la contrainte en terre 
interdit à la plupart des actifs agricoles d’augmenter la productivité de leur travail par la moto-
mécanisation à grande échelle. Enfin, des simulations numériques projetant l’Inde en 2050 montrent 
quels facteurs extérieurs à l’agriculture barrent la route de Lewis à ce pays et d’autres. L’article 
introduit et discute alors un autre paradigme de développement, celui d’une intensification écologique 
hautement productive à petite échelle, intensive en travail comme en savoirs génériques et locaux, 
insérée dans le secteur manufacturier comme dans celui des services. 
 
Mots-clés : Agriculture, Productivité, Développement, Transformation structurelle, Pauvreté, Agro-
Ecologie. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper questions the Lewis Path perspective of a “world without agriculture” which 
underpins the “structural transformation” paradigm of “modern growth.” It shows that the Lewis 
Path is only one of four potential structural paths, and that half of the world’s population is 
spiralling into a “Lewis Trap” with more farmers and an increasing income gap between them 
and other workers. After showing how land constraints and the productivity dynamics outside 
agriculture might prevent this population from switching to a Lewis Path, it delineates the 
condition of an alternative path that would not transfer the disparity problem to cities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the aftermath of the sharp 2007-08 increases in food prices, many agricultural economists 
denounced the lack of interest in agriculture which began the mid-1980s in both the academic 
and donor communities (Janvry, 2010). The soaring prices exacerbated the pre-existing 
concentration of poverty and under-nutrition in rural areas of developing countries (Chen & 
Ravallion, 2007). The recommendation emerged to increase R&D (research and development) 
spending “to restore productivity growth” (Alston, Beddow, & Pardey, 2009) “so that agriculture 
can play its role as an engine of growth and poverty reduction and act as the longer-term pillar 
of the twin-track approach to fighting hunger” (FAO, 2009). 
 
 The role of agriculture as an engine of growth was emphasized early on by the Physiocrats 
(Quesnay) and the Classical school (Ricardo). After World War II, agriculture became a key 
component of the “Structural Transformation” paradigm (Chenery & Srinivasan, 2007: 197-465). 
This paradigm is anchored in economic theories about interrelated structural changes between 
the “traditional” (agriculture) and “modern” (non-agriculture) sectors (Lewis, 1954) and in the 
historical experience of “modern economic growth” (Kuznets, 1966): agriculture provides labour 
and savings in addition to low-cost food to the process of industrialization and urbanization and, 
in turn, industry provides increasingly cheaper agricultural inputs that improve yields. Labour 
productivity of the rural economy then rises, wages are drawn up and poverty is gradually 
eliminated. This is the “Lewis Path” and this path ultimately leads to a “world without 
agriculture” (Timmer, 1988, 2009) where the share of agriculture in both total labour and value 
added is 2-3% once productivity and income across the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
have converged (Larson & Mundlak, 1997). 
 
 Whether this virtuous circle is initiated by a technical revolution in agriculture, in industry 
or in both, this paradigm supports the longstanding view that “low agricultural productivity is a 
major reason that some countries are poor” and that barriers to “modern agricultural technology 
subject to exogenous technical change” jam the whole developmental process (Gollin, Parente, & 
Rogerson, 2002). 
 
 In this paper, our aim is to show that, although important, high levels of agricultural 
productivity per hectare do not suffice to embark upon the Lewis Path with a view to 
eradicating poverty as this path implies meeting other conditions which remain beyond the 
possibilities of most developing countries. 
 
 We first show that the Lewis Path is only one of four possible paths of structural 
transformation and that routes actually followed by world regions over the past half century 
cover this range of options (section 2). Second, we carry out a calorie-based assessment of 
productivity growth in agriculture since the 1960’s that helps characterize the growth engine at 
play while introducing the role of the relative growth rate of labour productivity in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (section 3). Third, we conduct a heuristic exercise on 
India to show the difficulties of switching to a Lewis Path over the next half-century and 
beyond (section 4). We conclude by focusing on the necessity to revisit the content of technical 
progress in agriculture and the relationships between both rural and urban areas and 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
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2. The Lewis path confronted with historical evidence 
 
 2.1. Technology and labour productivity in agriculture: a “TALA” fundament 
 
 Comparative research on productivity growth in agriculture was stimulated by Schultz 
(1953) and Farell (1957) in parallel with the growing influence of the Solow (1957) growth 
model  to measure aggregate productivity. Ruttan (2002) detects three stages in its 
development: 
 
(1) Partial productivity ratios (output per worker and per hectare) reveal wide differences from 
country to country. 
 
(2) Multifactor productivity estimates through cross-country production functions led Hayami 
and Ruttan (2002) to conclude that resource endowments (land and livestock), modern technical 
inputs (machinery and fertilizer) and human capital (including technical education) each 
accounted for around one-fourth of the differences in labour productivity between developed and 
less-developed countries, and that scale economies, “present in developed countries but not in 
less developed countries,” accounted for only 15%. They suggested that population pressure on 
land resources could be circumvented and labour productivity increased by several multiples (up 
to the levels of Western Europe in the early 1960s) by investing in research, human capital and 
modern agricultural inputs. 
 
(3) The Malmquist (frontier productivity) approach more recently indicated a widening 
productivity gap between developed and developing countries from the early 1960s to the early 
1990s, and declining total factor productivity in developing countries (relative to the frontier 
countries) with less technical change against efficiency change.  
 
 These three approaches are faced with data limitations that will be discussed in the next 
section. Let us first introduce a slight change in the usual representation of technology and 
labour productivity trends in world agricultures. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) or Craig et al. 
(1997) show them along five graphical dimensions: yield or partial land productivity (y-axis), 
partial labour productivity (x-axis), acreage of land per agricultural worker (iso-curve), time 
(years) and space (countries or regions). We instead plot land productivity and land availability 
per farmer on the y-axis and x-axis respectively (Figure 1) to clearly display the two orthogonal 
directions along which labour productivity (iso-curves) can be increased in agriculture: 
“intensification” (higher production per unit of land with irrigation, fertilizers, etc.) and 
“motorization” (higher cultivated land per worker with tractors, combine harvesters, etc.). 
“Motorization” means actually “moto-mechanization” (Mazoyer & Roudart, 1997), using motors 
instead of human or animal energy to drive ploughs, sowers, cultivators, sprayers, harvesters 
and other agricultural machinery. The higher the acreage of land per agricultural worker, the 
more profitable under the conditions that cheap machinery and fossil fuels are accessible.  
 
 
Figure 1. An alternative representation of land 
and labour productivity pathways 
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 This graphical representation pictures a TALA identity, “Technology, Affluence and Labour 
productivity in Agriculture,” given in Equation 1 where Q denotes the agricultural production 
(in tonnes or other units), A the acreage of cultivated land (ha) and La the workforce in 
agriculture (heads). In TALA, a variation in labour productivity (Q/La, in tonne/worker) is the 
product of variations in “intensification” (Q/A, in tonne/ha) and “motorization” (A/La, in 
ha/worker): 
 
Q/A y A/La = Q/La TALA (1) 
 
 
 2.2. Structural transformation: a taxonomy of potential paths 
 
 It is easy to pass from this TALA identity to the OTAWA identity, “Outcome, Technology, 
Affluence and Workforce in Agriculture,” used by Malassis and Padilla (1986) to characterize 
socioeconomic patterns of agricultural production1. OTAWA shows how “intensification” and 
“motorization” co-evolve with the share of agricultural labour into total population (La/N) to 
contribute to total per capita production (Q/N) (Equation 2): 
 
Q/N = Q/A y A/La y La/N OTAWA (2) 
 
 The share of agricultural labour is an important parameter of the “growth engine” at play. It 
introduces our central question: how far past increases in agricultural per capita production 
(Q/N) were driven by “intensification” (higher Q/A) and by the “discharging” (Sauvy, 1980) of 
labour from agriculture to other sectors (lower La/N) that enables land per worker to increase 
and motorization to develop (higher A/La)? Is this discharging fast enough to make possible a 
pace of agricultural motorisation that boosts both agricultural labour productivity and the 
convergence of labour incomes across sectors?  
 
 To explore this cross-sectorial dynamic, two indicators can be extracted from the statistics 
of value-added (Y) in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (Y=Ya+Yna): 
y the “Labour Income Gap” (LIG), i.e. the difference (used in Timmer, 2009) between the share 
of agriculture in total value-added and that of farmers in total labour (Equation 3) 
y the “Labour Income Ratio” (LIR), i.e. the ratio (used in Yujiro Hayami & Godo, 2004) 
between the above two shares (Equation 4): 
 
(Ya/Y) – (La/L) Labour Income Gap (LIG) (3) 
(Ya/Y) / (La/L) Labour Income Ratio (LIR) (4)
 
In the Lewis Path, LIG is initially negative (income per agricultural worker lower than national 
average) and tends towards zero, while LIR, initially less than one, increases towards unity.  
 
 The LIR indicator can be used heuristically to characterize the conditions under which the 
structural transformation towards a “world without agriculture” can take place, and to identify 
alternative pathways when these conditions are not met. To do so, let us crossbreed two 
derivatives with respect to time.  
 
 Equation 6 shows that LIR increases only when agricultural labour productivity Өa = Ya/La 
grows faster than average labour productivity Ө = Y/L: 
 
ln(LIR) = ln(Ya) – ln(Y) – ln(La) + ln(L) = ln(Өa) – ln(Ө) (5)
 ⇒  LİR/LIR = Ө̇̇a/Өa – Ө̇/Ө (6)
 
 Equation 8 shows that the number of agricultural workers decreases only when agricultural 
labour productivity Өa grows faster than agricultural output Ya: 
 
ln(Өa) = ln(Ya/La) (7) 
⇒  L̇a/La = Ẏa/Ya – Ө̇̇a/Өa (8)
 
                                                          
1 OTAWA (our own denomination as for “TALA”) is similar to the “IPAT identity” used in the environmental literature 
(Ehrlich & Holdren, 1972; Waggoner & Ausubel, 2002), where I (environmental impacts) = N (population size) y A 
(level of affluence) y T (level of technology), and the “Kaya identity” in the energy literature (from the name of the 
Japanese engineer Yoichi Kaya). 
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 Depending on the sign of the variation of LIR and of La, three other pathways than the 
“Lewis Path” can be identified and characterized according to the relative growths of Ya, Өa and 
Ө (Table 1). 
 
(a) In path A, farm and nonfarm labour incomes converge (LIR → 1) while the number of 
farmers increases (L̇a/La > 0). High growth in demand for agricultural products (Ya) pulls 
farmers wealth up (Өa) faster than average (Ө). This is a “Farmer-Developing” path. The 
interpretation of this path is not univocally optimistic since if agricultural demand comes from 
the foreign rather than the domestic market, it may be consistent with growing urban poverty. 
 
(b) In path B, labour incomes also converge but the agricultural workforce decreases. Outgoing 
farmers are replaced by motorized equipment that boosts agricultural labour productivity (Өa): 
it grows faster than demand for agricultural products (Ya) and than average labour productivity 
(Ө). This is the Lewis Path. 
 
(c) In path C, the income differential widens (LİR/LIR < 0) and the agricultural workforce 
increases. Farmers’ labour productivity (Өa) increases less rapidly than agricultural output (Ya) 
and average labour productivity (Ө). This is a “Lewis Trap,” the polar opposite of the Lewis 
Path. Unless new arable lands become available, average acreage per farmer decreases, thereby 
diminishing the possibility of increasing labour productivity with motorization.  
 
(d) In path D, the number of farmers decreases and the income gap with non-agricultural 
workers widens. This is a “Farmer-Excluding” path where farmers become fewer and poorer 
relative to other workers. 
 
Active population in agriculture 
Increasing Decreasing 
Table 1. Typology of structural 
transformation paths 
 
L̇a/La > 0  
(Ө̇̇a/Өa < Ẏa/Ya) 
L̇a/La < 0 
(Ө̇̇a/Өa > Ẏa/Ya) 
Narrowing 
LİR/LIR > 0 
(Ө̇̇a/Өa > Ө̇/Ө)
(A) FARMER-DEVELOPING 
Ẏa/Ya > Ө̇̇a/Өa > Ө̇/Ө 
(B) LEWIS PATH 
Ө̇̇a/Өa > Ẏa/Ya, Ө̇/Ө 
Income differential 
between 
agricultural & 
non-agricultural 
workers Growing 
LİR/LIR < 0 
(Ө̇̇a/Өa < Ө̇/Ө)
(C) LEWIS TRAP 
Ө̇̇a/Өa < Ẏa/Ya, Ө̇/Ө 
(D) FARMER-EXCLUDING 
Ө̇/Ө > Ө̇̇a/Өa > Ẏa/Ya 
 
 
 2.3. Historical evidence: contrastive paths without convergence 
 
 On the basis of available worldwide statistics on value-added (see next section for data 
details), let us now see which of the above pathways have been followed over the last decades 
(1970-2007) and what part of humanity has embarked upon a “Lewis Path.” 
 
 It is often suggested that all countries have embarked upon a Lewis path by plotting 
country GDP per capita against the share of agriculture in total value-added and in total 
employment, and the difference between these two shares (LIG), as in Figure 2. This vision is 
questioned by Figure 3 where countries are grouped into regions (see details in next section and 
Figure 6 in appendices). The latter clearly shows that the Lewis Path is followed only by 
industrialized countries and countries in transition. Latin America, the Middle East and Africa 
follow a “Farmer-Developing” path with an increasing number of farmers and a narrowing gap 
between farm and non-farm incomes2 , while Asia has entered a “Lewis Trap.” At the aggregate 
level, the whole world looks as if it is oriented towards a “Lewis Trap” given the demographic 
importance of Asia. 
                                                          
2 aggregated regional tendencies: within these regions, most countries followed this path but some followed a Lewis Path 
(Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Uruguay, Venezuela; Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia; Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa) and others entered a Lewis Trap (Haiti; Turkey; Angola, Botswana, Burundi, 
Chad, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Burkina Faso) 
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Figure 2. The structural transformation (1970-2007) 
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Based on Timmer and Akkus’s  representation of 
structural transformation (Timmer, 2009: 7), the 
figure shows all countries from 1970 to 2007 (5,020 
points without Kuwait and Iceland) and their 
respective: 
 share of agriculture in total value-added (light 
green points), 
 share of agriculture in total employment (dark 
green points), 
 agricultural value-added share minus agricultural 
employment share (black points), 
according to average value-added per capita 
(GDPpc in 1990 US$ per day, values between [0.1-
100.0]).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. The structural transformations (1970-2007) 
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The figure represents the cumulative annual growth rates from 1970 (=0) to 2007 of: 
- the active population in agriculture (x-axis) (FAO, 2010), 
- the income differential between agricultural and non-agricultural workers (y-axis) measured with the Labour 
Income Ratio (LIR, equation 4) in 1990-US$ (UNSTAT, 2010), 
in order to show what type of structural transformation path is followed (Table 1). The longer the curve, the 
faster the process. 
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 Table 2 provides additional information. Total GDP and labour productivity growths were 
the highest in Asia. In 2007, this region caught up with sub-Saharan per-capita income. This 
level was, however, lower than that all other regions held in 1970 (Figure 4). In these other 
regions as well, per-capita income increased, more slowly but with a growing convergence of 
labour income between farm and non-farm sectors. This convergence was the fastest in 
industrialized countries where per-capita income doubled to reach 72 US$ per day in 2007 
although it did not exceed 10 US$ anywhere else.  
 
 
Table 2. The structural transformation paths (1970-2007) 
 
 Population (heads) 
Workforce 
(workers) 
Economic growth 
(1990-US$) 
Labour 
productivity 
(1990-US$ / worker) 
Labour Income 
Gap/Ratio Pathway 
 Total Total Agriculture Total Agriculture Total Agriculture LIG (Eq.3) LIR (Eq.4) (Table 1) 
aOECD 1.08% 1.62% -0.89% 2.91% 2.76% 1.27% 3.69% -7.85% 2.40% Lewis Path
eOECD 0.47% 0.82% -3.42% 2.74% 0.79% 1.90% 4.36% -6.32% 2.42% Lewis Path
TRAN 0.38% 0.38% -1.96% 1.91% 1.07% 1.50% 3.07% 4.44% 1.67% Lewis Path
LAC 1.89% 2.92% 0.30% 3.50% 3.03% 0.56% 2.73% -4.01% 2.21% FD growth
MENA 2.44% 3.00% 0.67% 4.10% 3.07% 1.08% 2.40% -2.79% 1.36% FD growth
SSA 2.75% 2.80% 2.05% 3.28% 3.09% 0.46% 1.01% -0.98% 0.55% FD growth
sASIA 2.13% 2.28% 1.49% 5.17% 2.76% 2.82% 1.25% 0.58% -1.56% Lewis Trap
eASIA 1.49% 2.07% 1.35% 7.61% 4.38% 5.44% 3.00% 0.47% -2.31% Lewis Trap
World 1.61% 1.95% 1.18% 3.10% 2.25% 1.13% 1.06% -0.74% -0.07% Lewis Trap
 
Note: percentages are average regional annual growth rates between 1970 and 2007 
 
 
Figure 4. Income convergence/divergence (1970-2007) 
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3. Structural paths and agricultural technology: the land driver 
 
 3.1. Agricultural productivity through the lens of an alternative metric 
 
 Are these diverging trends from the Lewis Path driven by insufficient agricultural 
productivity that modern agricultural technology could boost if barriers were lifted? 
Comparative research on productivity growth in agriculture tends to support this diagnosis 
through evidence of a technology gap between developed and less-developed countries (e.g. 
Mueller, et al., 2012). But such studies faced one of the following limits: 
 
(1) They compare agricultural output per hectare crop-by-crop whereas a crop can be the main 
annual output of a unit of land or just a part of it. The first model dominates in developed 
countries under a continental climate whereas in tropical and subtropical countries, several 
crops can be harvested yearly with good irrigation and fertilization. The two models obey two 
different logics. In the multi-crop model, farmers have no interest in maximising the yield of one 
crop if it jeopardizes the returns of the others. They may be below the technical frontiers 
observed elsewhere for each crop but at the technical frontier for their complex combination of 
crops. 
 
(2) They compare indexes of total annual agricultural outputs, with production data in 
monetary terms deflated by a general price inflation to capture production changes over time 
and aggregated over baskets of agricultural products (Craig, et al., 1997). This method faces 
well-known difficulties: the PPP versus real exchange rates dilemma in comparing monetary 
indexes across countries, the structural change in the composition of the representative output 
basket, and the absence of detailed data on local prices. 
 
 To overcome these limitations, we estimated levels and trends in land and labour 
productivities after having converted and aggregated all tonnages of plant food harvested during 
a year into kilocalories (kcal), for (almost) all countries and over a 47-year period (1961-2007)3 :  
 
(a) We first checked and merged five international statistical series: “Commodity Balances,” 4  
“Land,”5  “Population”6 and “Machinery”7 from the FAO (2010) over 47 years (1961-2007) and, 
to analyse cross-sector incomes (see previous section), “Value Added by economic activity”8  
from UNSTAT (2010) over 38 years (1970-2007). Many islands or micro-states plus Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Oman, Papua New Guinea and Somalia had to be removed because of missing or 
inconsistent data, but our database covers 98% of the world population (2000) and of the world 
land area (Antarctica excluded). 
 
(b) We then converted and aggregated all harvested edible plant biomass into calories to 
produce the index of plant food productions Qr = ∑i (qirci), where r is a region, i a plant biomass 
edible in its primary form (cereal, oilseed, root, fruit, etc.) regardless of its final use as food, 
feed, seed or other9 , q the volume of production in metric tonnes, and c the conversion factor 
into food calories (kcal per tonne) according to the FAO (2001) or the USDA (2006)10 . The 
regions are Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), developing Asia (ASIA) divided into South Asia (sASIA) 
                                                          
3 See Bairoch (1999) for a preliminary tentative in this direction. Actually, this use of a calorie metric in agriculture is 
similar to using the ton-oil-equivalent or exajoules to build energy balances. 
4 of which agricultural production in tonnes 
5 of which “Arable land” (annual crops) and “Permanent crops” (perennial crops); we named “cultivated area” the sum of 
the two land surfaces 
6 of which “total population,” “urban population,” “agricultural population,” “total economically active population” and 
“total economically active population in agriculture” 
7 of which “agricultural tractors in use” 
8 of which “Total value added” and “Value added from agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing” at constant 1990 prices in 
US dollars (US$) 
9 55 product lines of the FAO’s Commodity Balances: Wheat, rice & other grains of cereals; Beans, peas & other pulses; 
Cassava, potatoes & other roots or tubers; Tomatoes, onions & other vegetables; Apple, oranges & other fruit; Soya 
bean, cottonseeds, olives & other oilseeds or tree nuts; Sugars & molasses; Cocoa, coffee & tea; Pepper, cloves & other 
spices 
10 for details on calculations and general checking of the estimates, see Dorin (2011) 
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and East Asia (eASIA), Transition Countries (TRAN), and industrialized countries of 1990-
OECD11 (OECD) divided into Eurasia (eOECD) and North America + Oceania (aOECD) 
(Figure 6).  
 
(c) We concluded by estimating partial land and labour productivities by dividing regional 
productions Qr by, respectively, the FAO net area under annual and permanent crops (A) and 
the FAO “economically active populations in agriculture” (La). For the latter, since the FAO 
uses new ILO12 estimates starting only from 1980 (5th edition, revision 2008), we reconstructed 
1961-1979 active populations using the updated 1980 values and the 1961-1980 annual growth 
rates computed from earlier estimates13 . The labour data include male and female workers 
involved in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and not only people producing plant food. 
Similarly, cultivated lands include land dedicated to other production than edible biomass, such 
as fibres, rubber, tobacco or fodders. The land and labour productivities thus tend to be 
underestimated, especially in countries with important non-edible biomass production or animal 
production14 . 
 
 3.2. Contrastive agricultural productivity paths 
 
 With TALA and OTAWA identities, let us now study how agricultural outputs and partial 
productivities in calories have evolved from 1961 to 2007. During that period, the world 
population increased by 116% and the production of food calories of plant origin by 186%, from 
less than 12 tera kcal (Tkcal) a day in 1961 to over 33 in 2007 (Figure 7a in appendices). This 
unprecedented production growth enhanced the world daily availability of plant food per capita 
by one third to reach 5,070 in 2007 (Figure 7b). This growth resulted from a large 156% 
increase in land productivity (8,620 kcal.ha-1.day-1 in 1961 to 22,110 in 2007: Figure 8b) and a 
small 11% increase in cultivated land (Figure 8a)15 . Only 153 million additional hectares were 
indeed cultivated for 514 million additional farmers (+68%) (Figure 9a): the average cultivated 
area per worker declined from 1.8 ha in 1961 to 1.2 in 2007. On average, per-farmer productivity 
increased only by 70%, from 15,320 to 26,095 kcal per day (Figure 9b)16 .  
 
 Figure 5 displays the regional 1961-2007 evolutions of the three TALA parameters and 
shows that world averages of land availability and productivity per farmer mask huge 
discrepancies between regions around a critical interval between 2 and 3 ha.  
 
 (a) Labour productivity: a boom in industrialized countries 
 
 Annual growth rates of TALA/OTAWA parameters (Table 3) confirm that the regions 
which embarked upon a Lewis Path increased their agricultural labour productivity the fastest, 
measured here in calories17 . In 2007 (Table 4), OECD’s plant food production per farmer 
reached 670,000 kcal per day on average (up to 1,992,000 in Canada, 1,908,000 in USA, 
1,118,000 in France, 1,107,000 in Denmark) while it remained below 120,000 kcal in other 
regions, and even below 14,000 in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 9b). This contrasting 
                                                          
11 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as in 1990 
12 International Labour Organisation, Geneva 
13 “Population-Estimates 2004 rev.” as released by the FAO in 2008. With these previous estimates, our world active 
population in agriculture reached 1,058,355 thousand people in 1980 (841,922 in 1961 and 1,308,611 in 2000) while it 
reached only 948,580 with the latest estimates (760,656 in 1961 and 1,217,540 in 2000). 
14 It is tricky to include animal products in the calculations (about 10% of the total world production of food calories) 
since their production relies on (i) domestic plant foods (already taken into account in our calculations) and imported 
ones (such as oilcakes), (ii) large but very poorly known surfaces of permanent grazing areas (pastures, savannah, 
shrubs, etc.). 
15 This leads us to estimate that 90% of the world plant food production growth was based on an increase in land 
productivity and not land extension, with of course regional specificities (about 65% in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America for example): see Table 3 ([5]/[3]). 
16 As a combined effect of these evolutions, the world average number of persons nourished by a farmer has increased 
from 4.0 to 5.2 (+29%). 
17 Similar growth rates of labour productivity in agriculture are obtained despite the change of metric, from per-worker 
value-added in 1990-US$ (Table 2, column [7]) to per-worker production of plant calories (Table 3, column [8]). One 
exception is East Asia where high value-added productions such as meat grew faster than the plant food productions. 
Results of Table 3 over 1970-2007: 3.90% (aOECD, vs. 3.69% in 1990-US$), 4.77% (eOECD, vs. 4.36%), 2.61% (TRAN, 
vs. 3.07%), 2.98% (LAC, vs. 2.73%), 2.11% (MENA, vs. 2.40%), 0.51% (SSA, vs. 1.01%), 1.13% (sASIA, vs. 1.25%), 
1.55% (eASIA, vs. 3.00%).  
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result is explained by differences in per-farmer land availability (Figure 5) and in motorization 
(Figure 9c) that substitutes fossil energy for human and animal labour (Giampietro, Arizpe, & 
Ramos-Martin, 2011; Krausmann, et al., 2012). It results in huge incomes gaps18 : 115 US$ a day 
in 2007 for a farmer in industrialized countries compared to less than 2 $ in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia (3.7 US$ on the world average).  
 
 (b) Land productivity: the Asian leadership 
 
 There is a growing discrepancy between regional plant food productions per cultivated 
hectare, from one to two in the early 1960s (5,100 to 10,400 kcal a day) to one to three in 2007 
(10,300 to 31,400 kcal a day) (Figure 8b). Asia has the highest land productivity in food calories 
after having overtaken OECD countries in the mid-1980s19 . Its investments in infrastructure, 
education, credit, irrigation, fertilizers and high-yielding varieties certainly boosted both the 
number of crops per year on the same plot (crop intensity) and individual crop yields (mainly 
for wheat, rice, sugarcane and oil palm). By contrast, yield increase in industrialized countries 
has decelerated since the mid-1980s for many reasons: lower exports, increasing farm-gate prices 
of fossil energy and other inputs (fertilizers, water), lower incentives for sugar crops and other 
crops high in calories, soil or biodiversity erosion, environmental regulations, etc. Along with 
Asia, growth of land productivity was also high in MENA (the highest rate after Asia) as well 
as in Latin America where production of sugarcane and oilseeds has increased dramatically (for 
food, feed and biofuels) closing the yield gap with industrialized countries during the 2000s. 
Conversely, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where yield was at the same level as in MENA in 1961, it 
was multiplied only by two, the lowest regional growth over 1961-2007. This explains why Sub-
Saharan Africa has almost the same labour productivity as Asia in 2007 despite a 2.6 times 
higher land availability per farmer. 
 
 (c) Land per farmer: a symptomatic separation line 
 
 Average net cultivated areas per agricultural worker (Figure 5a) constantly decreased in 
MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (down to respectively 2.5 ha, 1.15 ha and 0.45 ha in 2007) 
while it constantly increased in Latin America, the transition countries and industrialized 
countries (up to respectively 4.0 ha, 9.9 ha and 26.6 ha)20 . These divergent evolutions combine 
trends in: 
y cultivated land (Figure 8a), that has decreased in transition and industrialized countries (–64 
Mha in total) but expanded in other regions (+217 Mha), especially in Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Table 3) at the expense of forests or permanent pastures21 ;  
y active populations in agriculture (Figure 9a), that has decreased in transition and 
industrialized countries (–64 M) and expanded elsewhere (+594 M) except in Latin America 
since 2000. It has almost doubled in Asia and was multiplied by 2.5 in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a 
result, 91% of the world’s farmers are now concentrated in these two regions (77% in 1961) 
where farmers still represent 60% of the total workforce (80% in 1961), while the share is far 
lower everywhere else (Figure 9d)22 .  
 
                                                          
18 Average agricultural value-added per farmer in constant 1990-US$. This income has to pay for human work but also 
fixed assets if any (land, draft animals, buildings, equipment, etc.). 
19 Countries above 40,000 kcal/ha in 2007: Malaysia (62,200), China (46,100), Bangladesh (42,500) and Vietnam 
(41,500) in Asia, Belgium (56,800), Germany (44,600), the Netherlands (41,400) and the United Kingdom (40,100) in 
Europe. 
20 This average cultivated area per worker does not account for disparities within a region or a country, which can be 
large. E.g.: according to the USDA, there were 2.2 million farms in the USA in 2010; their average size was 169 ha, but 
56% of them had an average size of 34 ha and cultivated only 11% of the land whereas 10% of them had an average size 
close to 800 ha and cropped nearly half of the cultivated land. Similarly, in many Latin-American countries a formal 
sector with a few large-scale capital-intensive enterprises adopting labour-saving technologies coexists with an informal 
sector composed of numerous small-scale, labour-intensive enterprises based on low wages. 
21 Between 1961 and 2007, the world area under pasture increased by 278 Mha (+9%), with +135 Mha in ASIA 
(+32%), +77 Mha in MENA (+32%) and +85 Mha in LAC (+19%). 
22 In 2007 15 countries out of 154 in our sample had less than 3% of their workforce employed in agriculture: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, the USA. Except for Kuwait, the UK and the USA, all of them had a percentage above 6% in 
1980. In 2007, a “world without agriculture” (3% share of total employment) would mean 93 million farmers producing 
each 358,000 kcal/day on 16 ha (39,3 million farmers and 35 ha, respectively, in 1961). 
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 3.3. The role of land constraints in structural bifurcations 
 
 Table 3 sums up the above results over 1961-2007 and shows that available land per farmer 
is a driver of bifurcations in structural transformation paths: its evolution (column [6]) either 
accelerates or decelerates the growth of agricultural labour productivity ([8]) enabled by higher 
yield ([5]+[6]=[8]).  
 
 The first key point is that high yield growth does not suffice to overcome the “deceleration 
effect.” As observed before by Hayami and Ruttan (2002: 10-11), in a “land-constrained” context, 
output per hectare rises faster than output per worker while it is the opposite in a “land-
abundant” context. With our caloric accounting, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa definitely fall in 
the first group, industrialized and transition countries in the second (Table 3). The latter have 
embarked upon a Lewis Path; the former are clearly outside it. 
 
 The second key point is that for the Lewis followers, high and growing availability of land 
per farmer A/La ([6]) is not driven by an extension of cultivated land A ([1]) but by a massive 
decrease in the number of farmers La ([7]+[2]) resulting from outmigration from agriculture and 
the development, since World War II, of heavy motorized agricultural equipment to replace 
farmers. Such “labour-saving” and “energy-intensive” growth did not occur elsewhere, or with 
delay and at a much slower pace. 
 
 Developing motorization and boosting agricultural labour productivity is conditional upon a 
large land endowment that often implies a high level of agricultural exodus. When this condition 
cannot be fulfilled, regions below a critical interval of 2-3 ha per worker seem to take a direction 
opposite to that of the Lewis Path. Before 1970, land availability was below 5 ha per farmer in 
industrialized Eurasia (eOECD), transition countries and Latin America –  much lower than in 
North America and Oceania (aOECD) but above 2-3 ha – and their Labour Income Ratio (LIR) 
rose to 0.6 or more in 2007 (Figure 4). All other regions kept a LIR value below 0.4. This value 
even declined in Asia which had the lowest availability of land per farmer in 1961 (1 ha or less): 
it has embarked upon the polar opposite of the Lewis Path, unlike industrial and transition 
countries that could increase their land availability per farmer as fast as their agricultural 
population declined.  
 
Table 3. OTAWA/TALA average regional annual growth rates (1961-2007) 
 
 Land Population Production Outcome Technology Affluence Workforce Labour 
 Mha Mcap. Gkcal.day-1 kcal.cap-1.day-1 kcal.ha-1.day-1 ha.worker-1 worker.cap -1 kcal.worker-1.day-1 
 [1] [2] [3] = [1]+[5], [4] = [3]-[2], [5] [6] [7] [8] = 
   [2]+[7]+[8] [5]+[6]+[7]    [5]+[6] 
aOECD 0.02% 1.11% 2.98% 1.85% 2.96% 1.18% -2.22% 4.16% 
eOECD -0.42% 0.56% 1.38% 0.81% 1.79% 3.06% -3.92% 4.92% 
TRAN -0.37% 0.51% 1.21% 0.69% 1.59% 1.72% -2.54% 3.31% 
LAC 1.11% 2.05% 3.49% 1.42% 2.36% 0.67% -1.58% 3.04% 
MENA 0.29% 2.50% 3.04% 0.52% 2.74% -0.33% -1.82% 2.40% 
SSA 0.93% 2.72% 2.63% -0.08% 1.69% -1.06% -0.68% 0.61% 
sASIA 0.15% 2.14% 2.72% 0.56% 2.56% -1.33% -0.63% 1.20% 
eASIA 0.56% 1.68% 3.34% 1.64% 2.79% -0.82% -0.29% 1.93% 
World 0.23% 1.69% 2.36% 0.66% 2.12% -0.88% -0.55% 1.22% 
 
Table 4. OTAWA/TALA regional values (2007) 
 
 Land Population Production Outcome Technology Affluence Workforce Labour 
 Mha Mcap. Gkcal.day-1 kcal.cap-1.day-1 kcal.ha-1.day-1 ha.worker-1 worker.cap -1 kcal.worker-1.day-1 
 [1] [2] [3] = [1]*[5], [4] = [3]/[2], [5] [6] [7] [8] = 
   [2]*[7]*[8] [5]x[6]x[7]    [5]x[6] 
aOECD 270 367 6,213 16,920 22,972 73.0 0.01 1,677,808 
eOECD 89 578 2,818 4,874 31,586 9.2 0.02 291,241 
TRAN 245 403 2,928 7,271 11,966 9.9 0.06 118,696 
LAC 170 561 4,355 7,758 25,611 4.0 0.08 103,051 
MENA 83 399 1,240 3,111 14,859 2.5 0.08 36,702 
SSA 217 789 2,226 2,822 10,257 1.2 0.24 11,882 
sASIA 204 1,544 4,399 2,849 21,562 0.6 0.22 13,198 
eASIA 226 1,927 9,094 4,721 40,197 0.4 0.33 14,204 
World 1,505 6,567 33,273 5,066 22,107 1.2 0.19 26,094 
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Figure 5. Agricultural productivity paths (1961-2007) 
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4. Unlikely Lewis Path and alternative utopias 
 
 4.1. Three scenarios for India by 2050 
 
 The key question is to understand under what conditions developing countries can alter 
their current trends to embark upon a Lewis Path. To provide some elements of response, we 
focus on the case of India as a typical example of a large country actually taking a polar 
direction to build a heuristic numerical experiment. 
 
 To do so, we use the “simple mathematics” of Timmer (2009: 10) which derives the growth 
of workforce and labour productivity in agriculture from (i) the growth of the total number of 
workers, (ii) the GDP growth in agriculture and other sectors and (iii) the labour productivity 
growth in non-agricultural sectors. We also build upon the Shukla and Dhar (2011) baseline 
scenario for India (2005-2050) founded on a computable general equilibrium model used for long 
run projections describing the links between the energy sector, macroeconomic parameters 
(demography and saving behaviours) and productivity trends at the sector level.  
 
 This baseline is characterized by a 7.3% p.a. GDP growth rate23 and an overall labour 
productivity growth of 6.2% p.a. until reaching 67 US$ per day per worker or 30 US$ per capita 
in 2050 (Table 5)24 . Agricultural growth is 2.6% p.a. against 7.7% in other sectors and 
agricultural labour productivity growth is 3.0% against 5.4% in other sectors25 . India, in this 
scenario, no longer follows a “Lewis Trap;” it switches towards a “Farmer-Excluding” path. 
Farmers are fewer and they earn on average 17 times less than non-agricultural workers in 2050 
compared to 6 times less in 2007. Their share in the total workforce falls to 30% (against 56% in 
2007) and urban population passes from 340 million in 2007 to 947 in 2050. Land availability 
per farmer increases but very slowly: 0.78 ha in 2050 against 0.66 in 2007. From this scenario, 
we test the sensibility of this transformation path to alternative assumptions about labour 
productivity growth rates in non-agricultural activities, ceteris paribus. 
 
 In variant 1, this rate passes from 5.4% to 5.8% p.a. With this optimistic assumption about 
non-agricultural labour productivity, India remains on the trail of the Lewis Trap. In 2050, 
farmers are not only the poorest (LIR = 0.1 against 0.3 in 2007) but also more numerous than 
in 2007, still representing 40% of the workforce in 2050. This is due to a less efficient 
“discharging” mechanism: higher labour productivity in the non-agricultural sector lowers the 
labour demand of this sector at constant output and its capacity to absorb as high an 
agricultural population. By 2050, the urban population will be less than in the baseline scenario 
(795 compared to 947 million) but 575 million poor people (farmers with their family) will be 
living in rural areas where average available land will have fallen to 0.58 ha per agricultural 
worker (against 0.66 in 2007 and 0.78 in the baseline).  
 
 In variant 2, we calculate the growth of labour productivity in non-agricultural activities 
which leads to a Lewis Path. This rate is 4.6% p.a. compared to 5.4% in the baseline and 5.8% 
in variant 1. With this lower labour productivity rate in non-agriculture and a concomitant rate 
of 9.3% in agriculture to get the same GDP, the discharging mechanism operates very 
efficiently. After four decades of unprecedented rural drift, the share of agriculture in total 
labour and in GDP is 2% and incomes between agricultural and non-agricultural workers will 
converge to 67 US$ in 2050 (LIR = 1). 
 
                                                          
23 Assumption lying between the 2000-2007 growth rate (5.6%) and very optimistic projections (e.g. 8.5% over 2007-2050 
from Hawksworth & Cookson, 2008). Let us note that an average annual growth rate of 7.3% over nearly a half-century 
would already be very exceptional for a large country and would likely confront constraints in the pace of construction 
of the underlying infrastructures. Over 1970-2007 (37 years), we found only China above such a rate, with 8.5% (rate 
measured with total value-added in 1990-US$ from Unstat, 2010). It was followed by countries only in Asia: Malaysia 
(7.1%), South Korea (6.5%), Thailand (6.2%), Vietnam (6.1%) and Indonesia (6.0%).  
24 See notes of Table 5 for details regarding projections of total and active populations. These projections capture the 
expected “demographic dividend,” i.e. a rise in the rate of per capita economic growth due to a rising share of working 
age people in a population. 
25 The average growth (6.2%) is higher than 5.4% and 3.0% because each worker passing from agriculture to non-
agriculture yields an incremental 2.4% productivity growth rate. 
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Table 5. Scenarios of Lewis Trap and Path for India (2007-2050) 
 
   1980-2007 2007-2050 2007-2050 2007-2050 
   Observed Baseline Lewis Trap Lewis Path 
      [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Population Total Mcap 1,165 1,615 1,615 1,615 
  annual growth 1.9% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
  Workforce % population 40% 45% 45% 45% 
Area Cropped Kha 170,000 170,000 170,000 170,000 
  Cities Kha 2,428 2,428 2,428 2,428 
Growth Total annual growth 6.1% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 
(VA) - Agriculture annual growth 3.0% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 
 - Other annual growth 7.2% 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 
  Total US$1990/cap.day 2.04 30.51 30.51 30.51 
Labour Total annual growth 3.9% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 
productivity - Agriculture annual growth 1.6% 3.0% 2.3% 9.3% 
(VA/worker) - Other annual growth 3.7% 5.4% 5.8% 4.6% 
Workforce Total annual growth 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
 - Agriculture annual growth 1.4% -0.4% 0.3% -6.2% 
 - Other annual growth 3.4% 2.2% 1.8% 3.0% 
 Total Mcap 463 735 735 735 
 - Agriculture Mcap 259 217 295 17 
  - Other Mcap 204 517 440 718 
Overview Agriculture % workforce 56% 30% 40% 2% 
  % GDP (VA) 16% 2% 2% 2% 
  LIR 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.0 
  ha/farmer 0.66 0.78 0.58 10.11 
 Cities Mcap 340 947 795 1,337 
  % population 29% 59% 49% 83% 
  Kcap/km² 14 39 33 55 
       
Notes: Values other than annual growth rates are those of the final year. Figures in italics are assumptions:  
(a) population: polynomial function of the year derived from the 2000-2050 annual projections of FAO 
(2010) (r2=0.999); 
(b) workforce: polynomial function of the population derived from the 1961-2020 annual data of FAO (2010) 
(r2=0.999);  
(c) cropped area: fixed value of 170 Mha after 2000 (169.3 observed in 2007);  
(d) urban area (cities): fixed value of 2,428 Kha after 2000, obtained by dividing the Indian urban 
population in 2007 (FAO, 2010) by an average density of 14,000 inhabitants per km2 (13,767 circa 2006 for 
all Indian urban areas according to Demographia (2011), and 14,083 for urban areas over 500,000 
inhabitants);  
(e) urban population: urban population of 2007 + new population after 2007 – new agricultural population 
after 2007; 
(f) agricultural population: agricultural workforce * β where β = ((population / workforce) – 0.25) as 
observed circa 2000; 
(g) sectorial annual growth rates (agricultural and non-agricultural value-added – VA): scenario 
assumptions from which the total annual growth rate is derived; 
(h) labour productivity growth rate (agriculture or non-agriculture): scenario assumption from which the 
other sector growth rate (non-agriculture or agriculture) is derived in order to achieve the sectorial annual 
growth rates. 
 
 
 4.2. Uncertain bifurcations, unlikely Lewis Path 
 
 The limitation of the above numerical experiments is to assume a constant GDP in the 
absence of a model endogenizing sector labour productivities, final demand (domestic and 
external) and GDP growth. This limitation does not however prevent showing how embarking 
upon a Lewis Path, in India as elsewhere, depends on a “fine tuning” of agricultural and non-
agricultural parameters. No extreme assumptions about the growth rate of outputs and labour 
productivity in the non-farm sector is indeed needed to pass from the “Farmer-Excluding” path 
of the baseline scenario to the “Lewis Trap” of variant 2 or to the “Lewis Path” of variant 1.  
 
 The “fine tuning” of the growth rates in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors would 
be less problematic with simulations allowing a more distant turning point beyond which the 
divergent agricultural and non-agricultural per capita incomes turn to convergence. But this 
turning point has been reached at later and later stages in the past by successful growth 
performers (Timmer, 2009), suggesting that “perhaps industry is becoming less and less able to 
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absorb labour” (Binswanger-Mkhize, McCalla, & Patel, 2010). This trend might continue and 
even worsen in the future for two reasons. First, although gains in industrial labour productivity 
through economies of scale and motorization/automation are reaching saturation in OECD 
countries, they are continuing elsewhere. Second, industrial production might increase more 
slowly in the future due to the increasing cost of oil and other non-renewable resources, 
strengthened environmental regulations, market saturation in industrialized countries, and 
slower wage increases in developed economies not fully compensated for by an increase of 
incomes in developing countries, etc.  
 
 In addition to this “fine tuning” problem, the end point of our numerical exercise brings to 
light another obstacle to a Lewis Path. By 2050, more than 80% of the Indian population will be 
living in cities, the density of which will reach 55,000 inhabitants per km2 if urban areas do not 
expand onto cultivated lands and remain at the 2007 level (about 2.4 Mha) (Table 5). As a 
point of comparison, the two densest cities in the world today, Dhaka in Bangladesh and 
Mumbai in India, have “only” 35,000 and 27,100 (Demographia, 2011). Such a mega-
urbanization would be a challenge never before faced in history. In Europe for example, cities 
have retained low density populations (e.g. 3,400 inhabitants per km² in Paris) and the Lewis 
Path was facilitated by the emigration of 60 million people to the “New Worlds” (35 million to 
the USA alone) between 1850 and 1930 (Losch, Fréguin-Gresh, & White, 2012). Large open 
spaces within cities or outside countries do not exist anymore and this situation could block the 
mechanism of boosting farm labour productivity through large-scale motorization. 
 
 Even with this assumption of mega-urbanization, available land per farmer only reaches 
10 ha. Faced with this constraint, Indian farmers may try to increase the land productivity with 
more external inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, selected seeds, fuels, irrigation) but the marginal 
productivity of these inputs decreases and the negative externalities of their intensive use are 
already high (natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, global greenhouse gases, animal and 
human health problems) (Dorin & Landy, 2009). They may use industrial inputs more 
efficiently but the ever-increasing price of the latter may wipe out all their efforts. They may get 
better prices for their products on international markets but they can hardly compete 
individually with today’s large-scale and well-organized agro-industries. They look trapped, as 
do most Asian farmers today. 
 
 To sum up, our baseline scenario and variant 1 raise a “disparity problem” between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors – by and large between rural and urban areas – which 
is presented by Yujiro Hayami and Godo (2004) as putting the development of high-performing 
Asian economies at risk of being undermined by severe social crises. Since farmers cannot 
migrate rapidly enough to crowded urban shantytowns, they thus might be condemned to stay 
with a business whose natural capital declines (soil, biodiversity, safe water) while their own 
capabilities are diminished due to poverty (nutrition, health, education). Variant 2, however, 
which requires lower average labour productivity in the non-agricultural sectors, might lead to a 
transfer of the disparity problem to cities with the co-existence, in urban areas, of highly skilled 
and highly paid labour with highly labour intensive and low wage services26 . 
 
 4.3. A tentative economic framework for an alternative utopia 
 
 We have seen why removing “barriers to modern agricultural technology” does not suffice to 
ensure taking a Lewis Path or escaping the risks of a Lewis Trap or Farmer-Excluding growth. 
GMOs, for example, may help to save some inputs such as energy (for weeding), pesticide, 
chemical nitrogen or water but they increase the cost of seeds and will not solve the labour 
absorption problem. It might be wise though to envisage an alternative utopia to the Lewis 
Path, a form of “Farmer-Developing” path (Table 1) in which the disparity problem would not 
be transferred to cities.  
 
 The economic fundamentals of such an alternative have to support an increase in total 
agricultural production (Q) and farmers’ incomes (Өa) without to strongly downsizing their 
numbers (La) or jeopardizing natural resources. They are encapsulated in Equation 9 which 
                                                          
26 The “Farmer-Developing” growth of Latin America and Africa? 
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shows how these parameters interplay with the cost of agricultural inputs produced by the non-
agricultural sector ( : chemical fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and the farm-gate price (p). 
Equation 9 equals Equation 10 which inserts the TALA parameters Q/A (yield) and A/La (land 
per farmer): 
a
naY
 
Өa = (pQ – ) / La anaY (9) 
Өa = (pQ/A – /A) y A/La anaY (10)
 
 Over the past decades, R&D and institutions have tended to focus on a few monocultures 
(wheat, rice, maize, soybean, etc.), the production of which has tremendously increased (Q), 
albeit with increasing input costs ( ) and growing environmental externalities (anaY Foley, et al., 
2005). Since unit prices (p) have simultaneously declined, these productions have been logically 
profitable (Өa) only with fewer farmers (La) on larger acreages (A/La).  
 
 Equations 9 or 10 indicate the parameters of an alternative to this labour-saving, input-
dependent and ecologically simplified food production system: 
(1) less industrial inputs  to lower environmental and production costs; anaY
(2) better context-specific biological synergies between numerous plant and animal species, 
above and below ground, to boost production (Q) and increase resilience to natural and 
economic shocks; 
(4) improved dedicated human abilities (La) to develop these small-scale and complex biological 
synergies on heterogeneous land quality and under variable weather conditions; 
(5) higher price p to farmers to (i) stimulate the provision of diversified tasty nutritious food 
and other goods such as fuels, fibres, drugs and building materials, (ii) sustain ecosystem 
services of local and global importance (safe water, carbon and biodiversity pool, soil fertility, 
nutrient recycling, pollination, disease and flood control, climate mitigation/adaptation), (iii) 
limit costly social safety nets in urban or rural areas. 
 
 This agenda actually resembles those of the “agro-ecological perspective” (Altieri, 1999), 
“agro-ecological matrix” (Perfecto & Vandermeer, 2010), “Doubly Green Revolution” (Griffon, 
2006) or “ecological intensification” (www.cirad.fr). It is trivial to say that it cannot be deployed 
without institutional improvements, in particular, land access and competition of small 
farmers27 . Less trivial is to highlight its potential of high economic efficiency. Indeed, contrary 
to widespread opinion, agriculture, unlike other sectors, seems largely subject to diseconomies of 
scale, i.e. more efficient at small rather than large scale. From Sen (1964) to Wiggins et al. 
(2010), an abundant literature discusses this “inverse size-productivity relation” in agriculture, 
and much data from all over the world shows that large farms, dependent on hired managers 
and workers, are less productive and profitable per hectare than small farms operated primarily 
with family labour. Economies of dimension in large-scale operations (information, credit, 
inputs, marketing, etc.) are indeed often offset by no monetary incentives for family members to 
work, by special institutional arrangements (cooperative or contract farming) and by the 
premium obtained from closer management and supervision of farm operations (Binswanger-
Mkhize, et al., 2010).  
 
 The conventional agro-industrial farming model will certainly continue to expand, especially 
in places where marginal productivity of external “modern inputs” (lab-seeds, petrochemical 
fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) is still high, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, or where land constraint 
is still low, such as in parts of Latin America. But working on alternative models remains 
relevant for these ever-growing populations since they have to avoid urban chaos or a Lewis 
Trap. 
 
                                                          
27 A small number of farmers and related upstream and downstream agro-industries with good education and 
communication usually constitute powerful lobbies that national and international policymakers can hardly resist. These 
lobbies tend to increase the costly “protection problem” of agriculture in high-income economies (Yujiro Hayami & 
Godo, 2004; Schultz, 1953) and a worldwide concentration of firms into a few agro-food complexes with oligopolistic 
positions that limit competition and control both prices and technical innovations. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper questions the Lewis perspective of a “world without agriculture” which is 
embedded in the Structural Transformation paradigm of “modern growth.” It does so by 
providing a heuristic model showing that the “Lewis Path” is being followed only by 
industrialized countries and those in transition: Latin America and Africa are following a 
“Farmer-Developing” path with an increasing number of farmers but a narrowing gap between 
their average incomes and those of other workers, while Asia is engaged towards a “Lewis Trap” 
where farmers are increasingly numerous and poorer compared to other workers and most other 
farmers in the world28 . 
 
 We have demonstrated how land constraints underlay these results by recomposing 
worldwide productivity trends in caloric terms from 1961 to 2007 and we have shown, through 
an illustrative numerical example on India, that switching towards a Lewis Path demands a 
“fine-tuning” of productivity growth in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to solve the 
“discharging” problem from the latter to the first. These land and fine-tuning obstacles cannot 
be addressed through the route followed by industrialized countries in the past. In Western 
Europe for example, Lewis Structural Transformation began long ago, was eased by labour-
intensive industry, by labour emigration to low-density cities as well as to outside Europe until 
World War II, then by policies encouraging a “modern agriculture” (Servolin, 1989) with no 
more “peasants” (Gervais, Servolin, & Weil, 1965; Mendras, 1967) but few heavy-motorized 
“agriculturalists” until reaching a “world without agriculture” in the early 21st century (3% of 
workforce and GDP). 
 
 Asia cannot replicate this experience nor share the utopia of a few large-scale farmers and 
agro-industries feeding the bulk of humankind in huge megacities. We then delineated the 
economic conditions of an alternative “farmer-inclusive” path that does not transfer the disparity 
problem to cities. This path demands deep redirections of technical and institutional innovations 
for supporting “minifundists” (i) developing integrated agro-food systems manufacturing food, 
energy and other products (ii) paid for the many ecological and social services they can deliver 
and that humankind is now looking for at local and global scales.  
 
 A paradigm shift may be necessary not only in Asia but also in (i) Africa and Latin 
America to avoid unexpected bifurcations towards a Lewis Trap, or growing poverty and 
violence in cities, (ii) industrialized countries faced with the ecological, economical and social 
limits of large-scale specialized agro-industrial farming in almost empty rural areas.  
 
 Minifundist knowledge-intensive and context-specific agriculture embedded in manufacture 
and service sectors has to be largely invented. It has to be incorporated in reflections on the 
redeployment of R&D whose “payoffs will only happen if the effort is sufficiently massive, 
concerted, and sustained” (Janvry, 2010). Although indeed the consensus about this effort is 
enlarging it remains urgent to specify its contents and expected benefits (UNEP, 2011). It opens 
a research agenda for economists, integrated modelling and institutional research in view of 
answering two intertwined questions and avoiding a “perfect storm” in the future (Hertel, 2011): 
(1) what institutions to promote and remunerate properly collective and public goods provided 
by agriculture and related rural activities? (2) how this new agriculture and rural organization 
can emerge and coexist with large-sized agro-industries that now feed a growing portion of 
humankind? 
                                                          
28 We conducted the analysis at a scale disregarding sub-regional and sub-national discrepancies not to blur the 
presentation with an overflow of data and figures. We deliberately presented the results by large regions without 
separating large countries like China, India, Brazil or South-Africa. Actually, further analysis would show the necessity 
of an even finer degree of granularity, but this would not change the overall message of this paper. 
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Figure 6. Map of countries and regions 
Cartographic source : Articque 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Plant food Production (1961-2007) 
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Figure 8. Land productivity (1961-2007) 
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Figure 9. Labour productivity (1961-2007) 
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